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THE NORMATIVIT Y OF  
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALIT Y 
B R E N DA N  LI M *  
The constitutional justification for the principle of legality has been transformed. Its 
original basis in a positive claim about authentic legislative intention has been repudiat-
ed. Statutes today are so far-reaching that it would be wrong to suppose any actual 
improbability in legislative intentions to abrogate common law rights. Two rival 
justifications for the principle have emerged in response. One is a refined positive claim: 
legislatures do not intend to abrogate ‘fundamental’ rights. The other is a normative 
claim: courts should attribute an intention not to abrogate rights in order to improve the 
political process. Distinguishing these justifications answers the vexed question of which 
rights engage the principle of legality. ‘Fundamental’ rights, in the first claim, just are 
those rights that legislatures do not, in fact, intend to abrogate. The normativity of the 
second claim is engaged not by ‘fundamental’ rights, but by ‘vulnerable’ rights not 
adequately protected by the ordinary political process. ‘Vulnerable’ rights may originate 
not only in the common law but also in statutes. 
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‘A statement concerning the improbability that Parliament would abrogate fun-
damental rights by the use of general or ambiguous words is not a factual pre-
diction … [I]t is an expression of a legal value’.1 
I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
The principle of legality does not enjoy the continuous historical pedigree that 
is widely supposed. I use ‘principle of legality’ in its narrow and ‘rather 
strange’ 2  sense to mean the interpretive presumption against legislative 
abrogation of fundamental common law rights. That presumption is, of 
course, just one aspect of the principle of legality, which is a wider set of 
constitutional precepts requiring that any governmental action be undertaken 
only under positive authorisation. The principle of legality, in the narrow 
sense, manifests in a ‘clear statement principle’ according to which courts will 
not, in the absence of clear statutory words, impute to legislatures an intention 
to abrogate fundamental common law rights. Although the principle seems 
outwardly familiar, its legitimating underpinnings shifted over the course of 
the 20th century. Those underpinnings appear still to be unsettled. I do not 
mean simply that the content and scope of the principle has evolved over 
time. The courts have transformed the principle’s very constitutional justifica-
tion. When Gleeson CJ said that it is ‘not a factual prediction’,3 his Honour 
might have said that it is not any longer a factual prediction, for it once was. 
One objective of this article is to chronicle the transformation from fact to 
value, an understanding of which is important in its own right. Another 
 
 1 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [20] (Gleeson CJ). 
 2 Philip Sales, ‘A Comparison of the Principle of Legality and Section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 598, 600. 
 3 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [20]. 
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objective is to explain the significance of the transformation for the proper 
approach to the content and scope of the principle. 
The clear statement principle was first articulated as a set of positive claims 
about the improbability of legislative abrogation of rights. The claims were 
‘positive’ in the sense that they sought to describe authentic legislative 
intentions — that is, what the legislature actually meant or intended. 
Throughout this article, I will refer to what the legislature ‘actually meant or 
intended’ as an inexact shorthand for the somewhat more subtle concept of 
‘what the legislature appears to have intended … to mean, given evidence of 
its intention that is readily available to its intended audience’.4 This textualist 
subtlety does not detract from the essentially positive, or descriptive, charac-
ter of claims about that intention. Founded upon a combination of political 
trust and forensic experience, the claims originally underpinning the clear 
statement principle were addressed to what legislatures were in fact likely to 
have intended in relation to the displacement of the general law, including 
common law rights. But as the reach of the activist regulatory state expanded 
during the 20th century, those claims became increasingly implausible. They 
must be regarded now as descriptively untenable. Yet the principle of legality 
remains. The courts have renovated the principle of legality to accommodate 
the sociological changes that accompanied the rise of the regulatory state. 
There are now two rival justifications for the principle, each one having 
emerged from a distinct path of accommodation. On the one hand, there has 
emerged a refined positive basis for the presumption: it is said to be engaged 
not simply by ‘rights’, but by ‘fundamental’ rights. These rights, so the argu-
ment goes, are so ‘fundamental’ that their intentional abrogation, even by an 
activist legislature, is highly improbable. This claim is buttressed by a further 
claim that Parliament can be taken — once again in fact — to have drafted its 
legislation against the known operation of the presumption. I will call this 
justification for the principle of legality the ‘positive refinement’. On the other 
hand, there is a new normative justification for the presumption, which I will 
call the ‘normative refinement’. This justification advances a set of claims 
about the constitutional relationship between courts and legislatures: courts 
should, it is claimed, prevent legislatures from abrogating rights, otherwise 
than by clear words, in order to enhance electoral accountability and the 
political process. This ‘normativity’ of the principle of legality places less 
emphasis on authentic legislative intentions. It is concerned to attribute, 
 
 4 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 248. 
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rather than to discern, intention. It is concerned not with ‘a factual prediction’, 
but with ‘a legal value’.5 
It is useful at this point to expand on the relationship between the princi-
ple of legality and the nature of legislative intention. Legislative intention is 
relevant to statutory construction in the sense that ‘the duty of a court is to 
give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is 
taken to have intended them to have’.6 When a court ‘takes’ a legislature to 
have intended words to have particular meaning, it engages in an objective 
exercise, and not a subjective exercise, of discerning and attributing intention. 
Although the exercise ‘must begin with a consideration of the text itself ’,7 the 
court also has regard to ‘[t]he context of the words, the consequences of a 
literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute [and] the 
canons of construction’.8 The principle of legality or clear statement principle 
is such a ‘canon of construction’. My argument is about the competing 
justifications for this canon. Both the positive justification and the normative 
justification are consistent with the duty of the court to give statutory words 
their ‘legal meaning’ in accordance with an objective legislative intention.9 
Both are consistent with the view that ‘judicial findings as to legislative 
intention are an expression of the constitutional relationship between the 
arms of government with respect to the making, interpretation and applica-
tion of laws’.10 But only the normative justification, and not the positive 
justification, is consistent also with the view that findings as to legislative 
intention are not expressions of any ontological truth, the very idea of which 
is said to be ‘a fiction which serves no useful purpose’.11 Importantly, however, 
the normative justification does not entail that view. It does not necessarily 
deny the existence of discernible, authentic legislative intentions. It could  
 
 5 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [20] (Gleeson CJ). See also Kent Greenawalt, 
Statutory and Common Law Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2013) 120–1. 
 6 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78] 
(McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) (‘Project Blue Sky’). 
 7 Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27, 
46 [47] (Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). See also Commissioner of Taxation v Consol-
idated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 293 ALR 257, 268–9 [39] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell 
and Gageler JJ). 
 8 Project Blue Sky (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
 9 See ibid. 
 10 Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455 [28] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and 
Bell JJ). 
 11 Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 592 [43] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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be formulated in terms only that in some circumstances courts may be  
justified in attributing an intention that might not coincide with the authentic  
intention. 
The debate about the authenticity of legislative intentions is too important 
and too rich for me to engage directly here.12 I simply emphasise that both 
camps in that debate can coherently embrace the normativity of the principle 
of legality, while those who reject authentic legislative intention as a ‘fiction’ 
cannot embrace positive justifications for the principle of legality. That is 
because the positive justifications depend centrally upon claims about the 
existence and content of an authentic intention. That at least a majority of the 
present High Court appears to adhere to the view that legislative intention is 
an unhelpful fiction underscores the importance of studying the distinctive 
features of the normative justification for the principle of legality. 
The categorical distinction between interpretive canons that are justified by 
considerations of (positive) expected meaning and those that are justified by 
(normative) policy considerations is well-recognised by diverse theorists in 
the United States,13 although those theorists can, of course, disagree about the 
proper classification of any given canon.14 Also recognised is the possibility 
that the justification for a single canon may change over time, and change 
categorically from being positive in character to normative in character. For 
example, of the ‘constitutional-doubt canon’, according to which American 
courts construe a statute to ‘avoid[] placing its constitutionality in doubt’, 
Scalia and Garner identify its original basis in ‘a genuine assessment of 
probable meaning’. But, they continue, because ‘[t]he modern Congress sails 
close to the wind [constitutionally speaking] all the time’, expected meaning 
‘is today a dubious rationale’ and ‘[a] more plausible basis for the rule is that it 
represents judicial policy’.15 
My claim is that something similar has occurred in relation to the princi-
ple of legality. But in Australia, for whatever reason, that transformation has 
so far been insufficiently appreciated. The two rival justifications for the 
 
 12 See generally Goldsworthy, above n 4, 232–47; Greenawalt, above n 5, 59–75; Richard Ekins, 
The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford University Press, 2012); Neil Duxbury, Elements of 
Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 92–119. 
 13 See William N Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Harvard University Press, 
1994), especially at 276; Antonin Scalia and Bryan A Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts (West, 2012); Cass R Sunstein, ‘Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State’ 
(1989) 103 Harvard Law Review 405, 454–60. 
 14 See, eg, William N Eskridge Jr, ‘The New Textualism and Normative Canons’ (2013) 113 
Columbia Law Review 531, reviewing Scalia and Garner, above n 13. 
 15 Scalia and Garner, above n 13, 247–9. 
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principle of legality, if they are both recognised, are not often clearly distin-
guished.16 It is not my purpose in this article especially to defend either one of 
the two justifications. It is important enough to explain the distinction 
between them and the consequences or possibilities that each entails. A 
proper understanding of the two different justifications, apart from having 
intrinsic value, also equips us with the resources to deal with the central 
doctrinal difficulties emerging in this area of the law. Foremost amongst those 
difficulties is the problem of identifying which rights are to be regarded as 
‘fundamental’ in the sense required to attract the presumption.17 As a Full 
Court of the Federal Court observed, the principle of legality ‘is sometimes 
criticised on account of uncertainty about the rights to which it applies’.18  
Indeed, it is controversial whether or not the gloss of ‘fundamentality’ is at 
all useful. Chief Justice Spigelman said that ‘[t]he word “fundamental” has 
work to do’,19 while French CJ suggested that ‘[i]t might be better to discard it 
altogether’.20 My exposition of the transformation of the principle of legality 
will explain this divergence of view. The refined emphasis on ‘fundamental’ 
rights was just one response to the implausibility of the claim that legislatures 
do not (as a positive matter) intend to abrogate the common law. In parallel to 
this positive refinement, however, emerged the distinct normative refinement. 
If one accepts the new normativity of the principle of legality, then one need 
not invoke positive claims about authentic legislative intentions, and can 
therefore bypass any perceived need to confine the principle to some narrow 
category of ‘fundamental’ rights. The difference between French CJ and 
Spigelman reflects a more basic difference between the new, rival justifications 
for the principle of legality itself. 
 
 16 Notable exceptions are the account given in Goldsworthy, above n 4, 304–12; and the short 
references in Rosalind Dixon, ‘A New (Inter)national Human Rights Experiment for Austral-
ia’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 75, 78; Mark Aronson and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review 
of Administrative Action (Lawbook, 5th ed, 2013) 177–8. 
 17 See Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights’ (2011) 35 
Melbourne University Law Review 449, 456–9; David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Michael 
Taggart, ‘The Principle of Legality in Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitu-
tionalisation’ (2001) 1 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 5, 6, 18. 
 18 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 
54, 76 [86] (Black CJ, Sundberg and Weinberg JJ). 
 19 J J Spigelman, ‘Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 79 Australian 
Law Journal 769, 781. See also Harrison v Melhem (2008) 72 NSWLR 380, 382–4 [2]–[11] 
(Spigelman CJ). 
 20 Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 46 [43]. Cf A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of 
Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197, 211 [42] (French CJ), 239 [148] (Heydon J); Monis v The 
Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, 342 [331] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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This is not to say that the normative justification would open the principle 
of legality to be engaged by just any right. The normative justification is 
controversial. Unlike the positive justification, as I will explain, it is open to 
objections from democratic principles. The necessity to accommodate those 
objections circumscribes the legitimate scope of the principle of legality. 
Rather than a search for ‘fundamental’ rights, the normativity of the principle 
of legality would direct us to a search for ‘vulnerable’ rights: rights claimed in 
circumstances where the capacity of the political process to discipline 
legislative action is inherently weak and curial insistence upon clear statutory 
language would strengthen that capacity. ‘Vulnerability’ as a criterion has, I 
will argue, both justificatory and explanatory force. Significantly, it is more 
sensitive than ‘fundamentality’ is to context, so that the same right can 
sensibly be seen to be vulnerable or invulnerable, and therefore engage or not 
engage the principle of legality, depending upon the context in which that 
right is claimed. Using vulnerability as the criterion may, furthermore, have 
some surprising results. One provocative implication is that ‘common law’ 
rights (never mind ‘fundamental’ ones) can be shown to enjoy no special 
claim to protection, so that certain rights originating in statutes would also 
come within the presumption against abrogation.21 This result is sympathetic 
with the pivotal role that legislative activism has played in the recent revisions 
of the principle of legality’s rationale. 
In developing these themes, the argument unfolds in four parts. This in-
troduction is Part I. Part II chronicles the transformation of the principle of 
legality and the emergence of the two rival justifications that are presented for 
it today. Part III takes up the question of which rights engage the principle, 
dealing in turn with ‘fundamental’ rights, ‘vulnerable’ rights, and finally 
‘statutory’ rights. Part IV concludes. 
II   T H E  P R I N C I P L E  O F  LE G A L I T Y  T R A N S F O R M E D 
A  Myth of Continuity 
The principle of legality in Australia is typically traced to the 1908 decision of 
the High Court in Potter v Minahan.22 When James Minahan tried to enter 
 
 21 See Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2006) 225 CLR 130, 159 [93] 
(Kirby J); Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public Employment (2004) 233 LSJS 110, 111 [4] 
(Debelle J); Buck v Comcare (1996) 66 FCR 359, 364–5 (Finn J); R v Cain [1985] 1 AC 46,  
55–6 (Lord Scarman); D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2011) [5.37]. 
 22 (1908) 7 CLR 277. 
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Australia, a Customs official administered to him a dictation test on the basis 
that he was an ‘immigrant’ within the meaning of the Immigration Restriction 
Act 1901 (Cth). Mr Minahan failed the test and was charged with being a 
prohibited immigrant found within the Commonwealth. This would have 
been unremarkable for the time, except that Mr Minahan had been born in 
Victoria. His father took him as a child to China, where he lived for 26 years 
until his attempted return. 
A magistrate dismissed the charge, finding on the evidence that Mr Mi-
nahan had remained domiciled in Victoria. An appeal to the High Court was 
dismissed, the magistrate’s factual finding not being disturbed and it being 
held that the Customs official had, in any event, administered the dictation 
test incorrectly. But the Court had to deal with an argument that ‘“immigrat-
ing” into Australia must be taken to mean “entering” Australia, and that every 
person entering Australia is prima facie an immigrant’.23 Rejecting this 
argument, O’Connor J concluded that ‘it must … be assumed that the 
legislature did not intend to deprive any Australian-born member of the 
Australian community of the right after absence to re-enter Australia’.24 His 
Honour articulated the applicable rule of construction in this well-known 
passage: 
It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow funda-
mental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, 
without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such 
effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their widest, 
or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were 
not really used.25 
The principle was not that Parliament is incapable of achieving the asserted 
result, but that it must use clear words to do so. This clear statement principle, 
as Chief Justice French recently explained,26 was not original to O’Connor J, 
who was quoting from Maxwell on Statutes,27 which in turn borrowed from an 
 
 23 Ibid 303 (O’Connor J). 
 24 Ibid 305. 
 25 Ibid 304 (citations omitted). 
 26 Chief Justice Robert French, ‘The Courts and the Parliament’ (2013) 87 Australian Law 
Journal 820, 827. 
 27 Sir Peter Benson Maxwell and J Anwyl Theobald, On the Interpretation of Statutes (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 4th ed, 1905) 122. 
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early opinion of the United States Supreme Court.28 Meagher has tentatively 
speculated that the principle might have originated even earlier.29 Certainly, 
some writers identify a cognate presumption against derogation from the 
common law originating in the 14th century,30 although markedly different 
constitutional arrangements then obtained.31 
Although there is obviously some relationship between the rule in Potter v 
Minahan and the principle of legality as we apply it today, any suggestion that 
the relationship is one of continuity should be resisted. In that claim I assume 
a heavy burden of persuasion. Chief Justice Spigelman, in his important 
article on the topic, described the interpretive principle as being ‘of longstand-
ing … go[ing] back at least as far as Blackstone and Bentham’32 and as having 
‘a long history in Australian jurisprudence dating back to’ Potter v Minahan.33 
Chief Justice Gleeson said similarly that ‘[t]here is nothing revolutionary 
about the principle of legality’ and, after identifying Potter v Minahan as the 
seminal Australian decision, said that the principle had been ‘re-asserted’ in 
modern times.34 Kirby J thought the principle could ‘be traced back for at 
least 300 years and probably further’.35 More recently, French CJ said that the 
principle ‘is of long standing and has been restated over many years’, citing a 
line of cases from Potter v Minahan to the present.36 Heydon J identified the 
‘many authorities, ancient and modern’ for the principle.37 Bell J similarly 
 
 28 United States v Fisher, 6 US (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (Marshall CJ for Marshall CJ, Cushing, 
Paterson, Washington and Johnson JJ) (1805). 
 29 Meagher, above n 17, 452–3, citing Somerset v Stewart (1772) Lofft 1; 98 ER 499. 
 30 Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 1964) 456–7 
n 6. Contra Roscoe Pound, ‘Common Law and Legislation’ (1908) 21 Harvard Law Review 
383, 400–2. 
 31 See Charles Howard McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy: An 
Historical Essay on the Boundaries between Legislation and Adjudication in England (Yale 
University Press, 1910) 257–328; John F Manning, ‘Textualism and the Equity of the Statute’ 
(2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 1, 36–56. 
 32 Spigelman, ‘Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’, above n 19, 775. 
 33 Ibid 780. See also James Spigelman, Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights (University of 
Queensland Press, 2008) 24–5. 
 34 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘The Meaning of Legislation: Context, Purpose and Respect 
for Fundamental Rights’ (Speech delivered at the Victoria Law Foundation Oration, Mel-
bourne, 31 July 2008) 23 <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_31jul08.pdf>. 
 35 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, 415 [30]. 
 36 A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197, 211 [42]. 
 37 Ibid 239 [148]. 
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called it a ‘longstanding principle of interpretation’,38 while Kiefel J described 
it as ‘not new’.39 Gageler and Keane JJ, with greater specificity, maintained that 
the ‘same rationale’ for the rule in Potter v Minahan continues to justify the 
principle of legality in its modern expression.40 Consistent with these observa-
tions, Meagher saw ‘nothing particularly new about judges construing 
statutes … to protect rights and interests considered fundamental at common 
law’.41 He identified in Potter v Minahan what he called the principle’s 
‘significant common law lineage’42 and described its current manifestations, as 
Chief Justice Gleeson did, as contemporary ‘judicial reassertion’.43 In the 
United Kingdom too, leading authorities see a ‘considerable common law 
pedigree’44 and claim that ‘[t]here is nothing new in [the presumption]: it is a 
well-established interpretative principle’.45 
This weighty orthodoxy illustrates the common lawyer’s tendency to con-
struct a narrative of continuity, even as change occurs. Goldsworthy describes 
the skilful agents of such change as ‘reluctant revolutionaries’ who are ‘loath to 
acknowledge — even to themselves — what they are doing’.46 English 
constitutionalism more generally was long recognised to have continued in 
‘connected outward sameness, but hidden inner change’.47 It is in the nature of 
the common law for its exponents to rationalise change within a framework of 
continuity: to build coherent bodies of principle from the synthesis of 
individual decisions, which may span many years. The principle of legality 
now bears that complexion of coherence. Potter v Minahan has been synthe-
sised with more recent decisions. But attempts to synthesise principle, 
important as they be, should not overlook that the reasons or justifications for 
a rule matter: ‘The principle [of legality] ought not … to be extended beyond 
 
 38 Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security (2012) 292 ALR 243, 378 [528]. 
 39 Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363, 416 [171]. 
 40 Ibid 450–2 [309]–[312]. 
 41 Meagher, above n 17, 452. 
 42 Ibid 453. 
 43 Ibid 452, 454, 464 (emphasis added). The phrase ‘judicial reassertion’ appears to have been 
used earlier in New Zealand: Claudia Geiringer, ‘The Principle of Legality and the Bill of 
Rights Act: A Critical Examination of R v Hansen’ (2008) 6(1) New Zealand Journal of Public 
and International Law 59, 89. 
 44 Johan Steyn, ‘The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts’ (2003) 25 Sydney 
Law Review 5, 18. 
 45 F A R Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: A Code (LexisNexis, 5th ed, 2008) 823. 
See also Sales, above n 2, 600. 
 46 Goldsworthy, above n 4, 2. 
 47 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (C A Watts & Co, first published 1867, 1964 ed) 59. 
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its rationale’.48 When the reasons or justifications for a rule change, so might 
the rule itself.49 The asserted continuity of the principle of legality is actually 
‘an illusion, enabling radical changes to be effected without anything much 
appearing to have happened.’50 In what follows, I demonstrate with close 
attention to the decided cases the changes over time in the underlying 
rationale for the principle of legality. Contrary to conventional wisdom,  
the contemporary principle of legality is much more than a ‘reassertion’ of an  
old rule. 
B  Original Justification and Critique 
In Potter v Minahan, O’Connor J claimed that a certain result — that the 
legislature infringes rights etc. — was ‘improbable’.51 He did not call the result 
‘impermissible’, or ‘indefensible’, or even ‘inadvisable’. ‘Improbability’, central 
to the clear statement principle as O’Connor J expressed it, denotes a particu-
lar set of positive claims: claims that the approach to construction is justified 
because it will ensure that words are not given ‘a meaning in which they were 
not really used’.52 These claims are positive in the sense that they are about 
what the legislature in fact meant or intended or was likely to have meant or 
intended. As Griffith CJ contemporaneously explained, ‘[p]resumptions are 
founded upon the existence of a high degree of probability’.53 In contrast, 
normative standards ‘do not merely describe a way in which we in fact regulate 
our conduct. They make claims on us; they command, oblige, recommend, or 
guide.’54 In 1908, the normative content of the clear statement principle was 
merely implicit. It consisted in a claim that courts ought to give statutory 
language a meaning in accordance with what the legislature actually meant or 
 
 48 Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363, 452 [313] (Gageler and 
Keane JJ). 
 49 Cf PGA v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 355, 373–4 [30]–[31] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ); Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 
574, 614–15 (Gummow J); Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 11 (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ). 
 50 Sir John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
vol 6, 12, quoted in Justice W M C Gummow, ‘The Constitution: Ultimate Foundation of 
Australian Law?’ (2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 167, 167. 
 51 (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304. 
 52 Ibid 304, quoting Maxwell and Theobald, above n 27, 122 (emphasis added). 
 53 (1908) 7 CLR 277, 286 (in the context of a different presumption). 
 54 Christine M Korsgaard, ‘The Normative Question’ in Onora O’Neill (ed), The Sources of 
Normativity (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 7, 8 (emphasis in original). 
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intended. The real work of the principle was done by the positive claim that 
Parliament was, in fact, unlikely to have intended to infringe rights. 
The positive or empirical character of the principle is consistent with the 
suggestion that ‘it may have evolved through a distillation of forensic experi-
ence of the way Parliament proceeded’.55 We know that several of the drafters 
of the Australian Constitution perceived no need for formal rights protection, 
in part because it was ‘unthinkable’56 that legislators steeped in ‘the traditions 
of acting as honourable men’57 would not, in fact, respect individual rights 
and freedoms. For Trenwith, for example, ‘it seem[ed] … utterly impossible to 
conceive that … Parliament [would] proceed to infringe any of the liberties of 
the citizens’.58 Interestingly, O’Connor-the-framer did not share this view. He 
favoured constitutional rights protections on the basis that legislatures might 
well be expected to ‘cut down … rights’59 or ‘commit an injustice’.60 Whatever 
insight this might give into his personal beliefs, there can be no mistaking the 
central importance of the more trusting view in the public grammar of the 
clear statement principle as O’Connor-the-judge later expressed it. 
The idea of a public grammar is important here: I am concerned to exam-
ine the justifications for the clear statement principle as they have been 
expressed. Judges express themselves in published reasons. Those reasons 
record what at the time of publication counted as a good judicial reason or 
justification. In 1908, whatever O’Connor J or others might privately have 
thought about the rule in Potter v Minahan, or about any instrumental 
reasons for its application, the rule derived such legitimacy as it had only from 
the acceptance of its public justification — justification in terms of Parlia-
ment’s actual intention and in terms of the sense in which Parliament ‘really 
used’ its words. 
The empirical claim that Parliament is unlikely to have intended to inter-
fere with common law rights would have been much more persuasive in 1908 
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than in more recent times. Having described the presumption as a ‘distillation 
of forensic experience’, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Diplock, speaking 
in dissent in 1975, explained that ‘[h]owever valid this particular aspect of the 
forensic experience may have been in the past, its force may be questioned in 
these days of statutory activism.’61 The growth of ‘statutory activism’ as an 
incident of the modern regulatory state means that intrusions by the legisla-
ture into what was previously the domain of the common law are now routine. 
Of course, many of these ‘intrusions’ were actually ameliorative of the 19th 
century’s ‘callous disregard of those who had few inherited rights to be 
protected’.62 By no later than the 1970s, ‘it came to be accepted that there was 
no area of law that might not properly become the object of parliamentary 
attention’. 63  Statutes ‘entrenched directly upon areas of governmental, 
commercial and social life which for the most part were regulated, if at  
all, by common law doctrines’.64 The proposition that a legislative intention  
to abrogate the common law would be ‘improbable’ was rendered descriptive-
ly untenable. Abrogating the common law is precisely what modern  
legislatures do. 
This critique of the rule in Potter v Minahan is most forcefully made in 
Australia by McHugh J. Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton (‘Malika Hold-
ings’)65 concerned the construction of s 167 of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), 
which provides that an owner of goods may pay a disputed rate or duty under 
protest and then bring an action for recovery. After the owner imported goods 
entered as duty-free, the Collector of Customs received advice that the goods 
were in fact dutiable and sued the owner for the outstanding sum. A prelimi-
nary question was whether the owner was entitled collaterally to dispute the 
liability to pay duty, it being argued that s 167 prescribed the exclusive 
objection procedure and precluded the owner from otherwise disputing 
liability. One of the owner’s arguments in response (not the one on which it 
succeeded) was that to construe the provision in that way would contradict 
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the rule in Potter v Minahan. It was said that such a construction would 
deprive it of its ordinary right in a civil action to dispute the elements of the 
claim against it. 
McHugh J, in a considered obiter dictum, expressed the opinion that the 
rule in Potter v Minahan did not apply. His Honour said of that rule: 
Hallowed though the rule of construction … may be, its utility in the present 
age is open to doubt in respect of laws that ‘infringe rights, or depart from the 
general system of law’. In those areas, the rule is fast becoming, if it is not al-
ready, an interpretative fiction. Such is the reach of the regulatory state that it is 
now difficult to assume that the legislature would not infringe rights or inter-
fere with the general system of law.66 
McHugh J repeated this critique in Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty 
Ltd, describing the presumption as ‘inconsistent with modern experience and 
border[ing] on fiction’.67 
The subsequent challenge for the principle of legality has been to accom-
modate this critique, the correctness of which has not been, nor could be, 
seriously doubted. Different accommodations of the critique have been 
proposed, but the differences between them have not always been recognised. 
It is to that topic I now turn. 
C  Accommodations of the Critique 
The original justification for the rule in Potter v Minahan can helpfully be set 
out in a syllogism: 
   Syllogism A 
 1  Courts should give statutory language the meaning Parliament intended. 
 2A  Parliament means not to abrogate rights unless it uses clear words. 
 3  (1+2A) In the absence of clear words, courts should give statutory language a 
meaning that does not abrogate rights. 
Premise 1 is the rule’s implicit normative content, while Premise 2A is the 
positive claim doing most of the work. It is Premise 2A that has been shown 
now to be false. Seeing the justification for the rule in this syllogistic form, it 
will be apparent that one may accommodate the falsity of Premise 2A by 
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either one of two routes. The first route is a positive refinement: restate 
Premise 2A in a form that is true (and adjust Conclusion 3 accordingly). The 
second route is a normative refinement: restate Premise 1. In fact, both routes 
have been attempted. 
1 Positive Refinement: ‘Fundamental’ Rights 
The first kind of accommodation involves refashioning the positive claim 
upon which the clear statement principle rests. In this accommodation, the 
normative content of the principle is undisturbed. We still begin from the 
proposition that the court should give statutory language the meaning 
parliament intended. Then, accepting that there can be no improbability in 
the statutory abrogation of the common law at large, the positive claim in the 
second premise is refined to say that there is, nevertheless, improbability  
in the statutory abrogation of common law principles or rights that are 
‘fundamental’: 
   Syllogism B 
 1  Courts should give statutory language the meaning Parliament intended. 
 2B  Parliament means not to abrogate ‘fundamental’ rights unless it uses clear 
words. 
 3B  (1+2B) In the absence of clear words, courts should give statutory language a 
meaning that does not abrogate ‘fundamental’ rights. 
This refashioning demands very close attention to the criteria for identifying a 
right as ‘fundamental’ in the relevant sense. 
This positive refinement is evident in the observations of the High Court 
in Bropho v Western Australia (‘Bropho’).68 It was accepted there, consistent 
with the positive claim underpinning Potter v Minahan, that the rationale for 
the clear statement principle ‘lies in an assumption that the legislature would, 
if it intended to achieve the particular effect, have made its intention in that 
regard unambiguously clear.’69 Their Honours then explained the need to 
identify a right that is truly fundamental: 
If such an assumption be shown to be or to have become ill-founded, the foun-
dation upon which the particular presumption rests will necessarily be weak-
ened or removed. Thus, if what was previously accepted as a fundamental prin-
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ciple or fundamental right ceases to be so regarded, the presumption that the 
legislature would not have intended to depart from that principle or to abolish 
or modify that right will necessarily be undermined and may well disappear.70 
Further explaining this accommodation in Malika Holdings, McHugh J 
carefully distinguished between ‘overthrow[ing] fundamental principles’, 
‘infring[ing] rights’, and ‘depart[ing] from the general system of law’, all of 
which results O’Connor J had in 1908 presumed to be ‘improbable’. For 
McHugh J in 2001, it was only abrogating ‘fundamental principles’ that could 
accurately be said to be improbable. Even then, his Honour cautioned that 
‘[w]hat is fundamental in one age or place may not be regarded as fundamen-
tal in another age or place’.71 His Honour did not regard ‘rights’ as necessarily 
‘fundamental’ in the required sense: 
Some rights may be the corollaries of fundamental principles. In that sense, 
they are fundamental rights … But nearly every session of Parliament produces 
laws which infringe the existing rights of individuals. Given the frequency with 
which legislatures now amend or abolish rights or depart from the general sys-
tem of law, it is difficult to accept that it is ‘in the last degree improbable’ that  
a legislature would intend to alter rights or depart from the general system  
of law …72 
The principle of legality was invoked in X7 v Australian Crime Commission 
to protect ‘the accusatorial nature of the criminal justice system’.73 In identify-
ing this as an aspect of the ‘general system of law’,74 Hayne and Bell JJ may 
appear to have rejected McHugh J’s attempt to discard that third limb of the 
rule in Potter v Minahan. Their Honours nonetheless described this aspect of 
the general system of law as ‘a defining characteristic’ of the criminal justice 
system. Kiefel J, the other member of the majority, maintained the language  
of ‘fundamental principle’.75 It would seem, therefore, that this feature of  
the reasoning of the majority should not be read as relaxing any requirement  
of ‘fundamentality’. 
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The clear statement principle, as expressed in Bropho and Malika Holdings, 
is concerned to describe in an empirically accurate way the likely intention of 
a legislature in the modern regulatory state. It accepts that there can be no 
presumption against modification of the general law, or even of common law 
rights. The presumption is accurate only in relation to ‘fundamental’ rights. It 
is in this way that, as Chief Justice Spigelman suggested, ‘[t]he word “funda-
mental” has work to do’.76 
To this refinement of the principle of legality has recently been added an 
additional layer of empirical justification. It is now said, by a majority of the 
High Court, that application of the presumption against the abrogation of 
fundamental rights is justified because it is ‘a working hypothesis, the exist-
ence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which 
statutory language will be interpreted.’77 The argument is that Parliament (and 
parliamentary drafters to the extent, if any, that the imputed knowledge of 
those individuals is relevant)78 can be taken to know that the presumption 
against abrogation of fundamental rights will be applied in the courts, so that 
an absence of clear words is therefore affirmative evidence of an intention not 
to rebut the known presumption. Goldsworthy explains the argument in 
terms of attributing ‘standing commitments’ to a legislature: ‘If I know that 
others attribute standing commitments to me, and do nothing to disavow 
them, I confirm the attribution and dispel any previous doubts’.79 This very 
argument was rejected in Bropho, in relation to the presumption that statutes 
do not bind the Crown.80 What made the argument ‘unconvincing’ were the 
‘not infrequent occasions’, empirically observable, where a legislature obvious-
ly meant to bind the Crown without saying so expressly.81 Putting to one side 
whether in the context of abrogating rights the argument is any more persua-
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sive than it has been found to be in the context of binding the Crown, the 
argument and its rebuttal in Bropho are positive or empirical in character: 
they purport accurately to describe authentic legislative intentions. 
2 Normative Refinements 
There is an alternative way to respond to the critique of the positive proposi-
tion that Parliament is unlikely to have intended to abrogate rights. Rather 
than try to confine that proposition to a narrower category of ‘fundamental’ 
rights, it is possible to relocate the principle of legality by revising its norma-
tive content. This argumentative strategy obviates any need to rely on a 
positive claim about likely parliamentary intention (which is consonant with 
the view that there is no such thing). In terms of the syllogisms set out 
previously, this alternative response queries the truth of Premise 1. It posits 
circumstances in which the courts should do something other than give 
statutory language the meaning that the legislature may in fact have intended. 
There have been two notable attempts in Australia so to revise the norma-
tivity of the principle of legality. The issue in Coco v The Queen (‘Coco’)82 was 
whether a Queensland statute, which empowered a judge to authorise the use 
of listening devices, extended to empowering the judge to authorise entry 
upon private property for the purpose of installing and maintaining a 
listening device. The High Court held that it did not. It applied the clear 
statement principle in favour of the common law right to exclude others from 
private property. Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ reiterated the 
Potter v Minahan rationale for the principle, but then added: 
At the same time, curial insistence on a clear expression of an unmistakable and 
unambiguous intention to abrogate or curtail a fundamental freedom will en-
hance the parliamentary process by securing a greater measure of attention to 
the impact of legislative proposals on fundamental rights.83 
Gageler and Keane JJ subsequently described this additional observation as 
‘[r]eflecting again the same rationale’ as the rule in Potter v Minahan.84 It is, 
with respect, difficult to see how this can be the case: Coco’s concern to 
‘enhance the parliamentary process’ is a categorically different rationale for 
the presumption against rights-abrogation. It is a normative, rather than 
positive, rationale. The thought appears to be that, because of curial insistence 
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upon ‘clear expression’, the legislature will be encouraged to give closer 
attention to the rights implications of its enactments. The notion of ‘curial 
insistence’ suggests a qualification upon the premise that the court should give 
effect to the intended meaning of the words. The ‘insistence’ is directed to 
preventing Parliament from abrogating rights otherwise than by clear words, 
even if in using general words it did in fact mean to abrogate rights. Thus, Sir 
Anthony Mason (who, as Chief Justice, participated in Coco) later said that 
‘some strong presumptive rules [are] of a fictional kind (because they do not 
reflect the actual legislative intent)’.85 The justification for the clear statement 
principle in this form appears to be something like this: 
   Syllogism C 
 1C  Courts should enhance the parliamentary process by securing a greater 
measure of attention to the impact of legislative proposals on (fundamental) 
rights. 
 2C  Parliament will give a greater measure of attention to the impact of legislative 
proposals on (fundamental) rights if the courts ‘insist’ that statutes will not be 
effective to abrogate (fundamental) rights in the absence of clear words. 
 3  (1C+2C) In the absence of clear words, courts should give statutory language 
a meaning that does not abrogate (fundamental) rights. 
An observation to which I will return in more detail later is that although 
Coco used the language of ‘fundamental’ rights, its internal logic works with 
or without that qualification. 
A different kind of normativity for the principle of legality emerged in the 
United Kingdom. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte 
Simms (‘Simms’)86 concerned whether a Prison Service Standing Order, made 
under a rule-making power, was properly construed to authorise a policy that 
imposed a ‘blanket ban’87 on interviews of prisoners by journalists. The 
applicants were serving life sentences of imprisonment for murder, and were 
seeking to persuade journalists to investigate the safety of their convictions. 
The House of Lords accepted that to do so would be an exercise of a funda-
mental freedom of expression and, moreover, an exercise ‘qualitatively of a 
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very different order’ from that general participation in political debate which 
is properly excluded by the ‘purpose of a sentence of imprisonment’.88 Their 
Lordships held the blanket ban to be unauthorised by the Standing Order. The 
contrary construction of the Standing Order would have been ultra vires the 
enabling legislation, which had to be construed conformably with the 
principle of legality.89  
Lord Hoffmann’s concurring speech articulated the rationale for the ap-
proach to construction in terms of the democratic process and electoral 
accountability: 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate 
contrary to fundamental principles of human rights. … The constraints upon 
[this power] are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality 
means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the 
political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambigu-
ous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications  
of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic 
process.90 
His Lordship’s explanation was quoted approvingly in Australia, first by 
Kirby J,91 then by Gleeson CJ.92 French CJ more recently adopted the pas-
sage,93 and Heydon J identified it as the ‘good reason’ for the principle’s 
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existence.94 Gageler and Keane JJ approved the same passage in Lee v New 
South Wales Crime Commission.95 
Forcing Parliament ‘squarely [to] confront what it is doing and accept the 
political cost’ is presented as a justification for not construing general or 
ambiguous language to interfere with rights. Even if the legislature in fact 
intended to abrogate rights with its general words, the court’s response is that 
it is not making any ‘factual prediction, capable of being verified or falsified’,96 
but expressing a legal value consistent with the rule of law. This justification 
for the principle of legality might be expressed in the following syllogism: 
   Syllogism D 
 1D  Courts should ensure that Parliament is made to accept political responsibility 
for its decisions to abrogate (fundamental) rights. 
 2D  Parliament will not bear responsibility if general or ambiguous statutory 
language is construed to abrogate (fundamental) rights. 
 3  (1D+2D) In the absence of clear words, courts should give statutory language 
a meaning that does not abrogate (fundamental) rights. 
Two points may be noted. First, as with Syllogism C, the logic of the argument 
holds with or without the qualification of ‘fundamental’ rights. Second, there 
is a flavour of curial resistance to being conscripted to do the political 
branches’ bidding. That is, the courts will not step in to give the desired hard 
edge to Parliament’s fuzzy language, but will instead insist that Parliament 
take the responsibility for its own choices. This emerging theme is evident also 
in federal constitutional law.97 
Each of Coco and Simms is a normative refinement in that each revises the 
normative premise of Syllogism A (that courts should give statutory language 
the meaning Parliament in fact intended). But the two accommodations differ 
in a crucial respect. The animating concern in Coco is the rights themselves. 
The Court regarded actual attention to rights as the salient enhancement of 
the parliamentary process. In contrast, Simms is process-oriented. It is 
animated by a concern to ensure not necessarily that the legislature give 
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anxious consideration to rights, but that it express itself clearly to the elec-
torate, taking responsibility for its decision, and so that the electorate can 
effectively discipline that decision. Expressing a policy clearly might be 
thought necessarily to require prior consideration, if not anxious considera-
tion, of the rights at stake, though the two concepts are analytically distinct. 
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘Saeed’) illustrates the 
distinction.98 One of the issues in the case was whether amendments made in 
2002 to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)99 manifested a clear intention to exclude 
or limit the requirements of procedural fairness. The amendments had been 
made in response to Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex 
parte Miah,100 which held that the statute was insufficiently clear to exclude 
procedural fairness. Extrinsic materials, including the Minister’s second 
reading speech and the Explanatory Memorandum, appeared to make very 
explicit that the amendments were intended now to exclude the common law 
rules. The Court held, nevertheless, that the amendments did not achieve that 
result. It emphasised that the relevant clarity of intention to displace funda-
mental common law principles must be found, if at all, in the statutory words 
themselves and not the extrinsic materials: 
Statements as to legislative intention made in explanatory memoranda or by 
Ministers, however clear or emphatic, cannot overcome the need to carefully 
consider the words of the statute to ascertain its meaning. … 
It may be accepted that the context for the enactment … was provided by 
the decision in Ex parte Miah and that [the enactment] was an attempt to ad-
dress the shortcomings identified in that decision. Resort to the extrinsic mate-
rials may be warranted to ascertain that context and that objective … But that 
objective cannot be equated with the statutory intention as revealed by the 
terms of the subdivision.101 
If the motivation for the interpretive principle were, as stated in Coco, that 
Parliament give a ‘greater measure of attention’ to rights, then the extrinsic 
materials, perhaps even more so than the legislative words, should be suffi-
cient indication of that attention. If, conversely, the underlying motivation is, 
as stated in Simms, the objective of ensuring the clear expression of rights-
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abrogative policy, to enable the electors effectively to discipline the Parlia-
ment, then the legislative words, and not the extrinsic materials, matter most 
(at least upon a theory that subjects of the law are entitled to know what the 
law is from what the law says).102 Under Coco, we should be concerned about 
whether Parliament paid attention to rights. Under Simms, we should be 
concerned about whether Parliament took responsibility before the electorate 
for its rights-abrogative decision. The different approaches encourage and 
permit different uses of extrinsic materials. 
D  Provisional Conclusion 
The transformation of the principle of legality over the course of the 20th 
century has not simply involved evolution in content and scope. Nor can its 
contemporary application be described as a mere ‘reassertion’ of an old rule. 
On the contrary, the very constitutional justification for its application has 
been transformed in response to the establishment of the activist, regulatory 
state, for which legislation is the preferred, and ubiquitous, mechanism of 
governance. A myth of continuity traces the principle of legality in Australia 
to Potter v Minahan, but the positive claims that underpinned that decision, 
however plausible they might have been in 1908, are obviously false in 
contemporary conditions. To accommodate that newfound descriptive falsity, 
the principle of legality is now justified on competing bases. There are two 
analytically distinct justifications: one is a refined positive justification, 
emphasising a narrow category of ‘fundamental’ rights and the genuine 
‘standing commitments’ of parliaments. The other is a new normative justifi-
cation, which acknowledges that modern legislatures might well intend  
to abrogate common law rights, but which urges the courts to insist upon 
 a clear statement of intent, so as to facilitate political accountability and  
electoral discipline. 
Understanding this transformation of the principle of legality, and the 
principle’s new justifications, is important in its own right. It also informs the 
vexed question of which rights properly attract the protection of the principle. 
That is the subject of the next section. 
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III   R I G H T S  EN G AG I N G  T H E  P R I N C I P L E  O F  LE G A L I T Y 
Not every right engages the principle of legality. It is an important and 
difficult task to articulate a principled approach to identifying the rights that 
do. First, I will consider the leading approach, which says that ‘fundamental’ 
rights engage the principle of legality. But this approach is necessary only for 
those who adopt the positive justification for the principle. For those who 
adopt the normative justification, I consider an alternative approach. Accord-
ing to this approach, the relevant rights are ‘vulnerable’ rights — those which 
the ordinary political process may be inapt to protect. We should, I argue, 
bring notions of ‘vulnerability’ to bear upon the content of ‘fundamental’, or, 
more directly, discard ‘fundamentality’ altogether in favour of ‘vulnerability’. 
Finally, I will explain that ‘vulnerable’ rights need not be common law rights 
but might also be statutory rights. 
A  Fundamental Rights 
The purpose of ‘fundamentality’, the ‘work’ that it has to do,103 is to improve 
the descriptive accuracy of the claim that Parliament did not, in fact, intend to 
abrogate a right by general or ambiguous language. That purpose sheds light 
on its proper meaning. The rights that are ‘fundamental’ in the relevant sense 
must be those rights which, it can be said as a descriptive matter, Parliament 
would not intend to abrogate absent clear words. So understood, ‘fundamen-
tal’ engages not abstract or idiosyncratic notions of what might be thought to 
be ‘important’, but rather the genuine ‘standing commitments’104 of legisla-
tures. That is, a ‘fundamental’ right is one with such ‘entrenched and con-
sistent recognition in the decided cases as a fundamental right’105 that it can 
be said, with descriptive plausibility if not truth, that Parliament intends to 
respect it. 
This argument was put to the High Court in Australian Crime Commis-
sion v Stoddart (‘Stoddart’).106 The Australian Crime Commission sought to 
‘equate “fundamental” with “well-established”’107 and said that the right in 
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question — a privilege against spousal incrimination — was so doubtful or 
uncertain in its very existence that there could not be said to be any standing 
commitment against its abrogation.108 The issue was not decided because the 
appeal was allowed on the anterior ground that spousal privilege did not exist. 
Nevertheless, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ tentatively accepted the argument, 
noting in an obiter dictum that ‘[i]t would appear … that the fundamental 
right, freedom, immunity or other legal rule which is said to be the subject of 
the principle [of legality]’s protection, is one which is recognised by the courts 
and clearly so.’109 Heydon J, in dissent, rejected the argument: ‘a right does not 
become fundamental merely because cases call it that. And a right does not 
cease to be fundamental merely because cases do not call it that.’110 More 
recently, Gageler and Keane JJ appeared also to reject the argument, holding 
that the principle of legality is not confined to the protection of rights that are 
‘of long standing or recognised and enforceable or otherwise protected at 
common law’.111 
Aronson and Groves, in a passing treatment, describe the Australian 
Crime Commission’s argument as ‘dubious’.112 Though they do not elaborate 
upon their reasons for that view, one plausible reason is that the argument 
embraces a static conception of ‘fundamentality’. It is static in the sense that, 
on this theory of fundamentality, it becomes difficult for courts to enforce a 
view that Parliament has adopted new standing commitments or discarded 
old ones, even as attitudes to rights and their scope might evolve.113 Of course, 
the incapacity of courts to assert new parliamentary standing commitments is 
not obviously objectionable, or even all that static, because new standing 
commitments can always be declared in statutes. The Human Rights (Parlia-
mentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), for example, declares the Commonwealth 
Parliament’s standing commitment to the ‘human rights’ defined in that Act 
by reference to various international conventions and treaties. Furthermore, 
non-static conceptions of fundamentality potentially suffer from idiosyncratic 
application. Heydon J made notable attempts to articulate a substantive 
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account of fundamentality. In Stoddart, his Honour said that ‘spousal privi-
lege … favours liberty. It preserves a small area of privacy and immunity from 
the great intrusive powers of the state, and those who invoke them. It fosters 
human dignity. It helps maintain self-respect.’114 More recently, he explained 
why the common law right of free speech was ‘sufficiently important to attract 
the principle of legality’.115 His account drew on intrinsic values in human 
personality and instrumental values in fostering other freedoms and ‘a liberal-
democratic constitutional order’.116 It is difficult to disagree with Heydon J 
about the importance of free speech. But if ‘fundamental rights’ are  
those rights which are ‘sufficiently important’ to a judge’s own conception  
of a desirable ‘constitutional order’, then the scope for idiosyncrasy is  
readily apparent. 
The difficulty charting a course between stasis and idiosyncrasy is, per-
haps, why French CJ suggested that the notion of ‘fundamentality’ might be 
discarded altogether. 117  As I explained previously, ‘fundamentality’ is a 
necessary gloss only if one adopts the positive refinement of the rule in 
Potter v Minahan (Syllogism B). Within that accommodation, ‘fundamentali-
ty’ serves the purpose of narrowing the scope of the positive claim that 
Parliament is unlikely to have intended a certain result. In contrast, the 
normative refinements (Syllogisms C and D) work perfectly well without 
reliance on the notion. Each of them rejects the unqualified premise that 
courts must give effect to some discernible, authentic legislative intention, and 
replaces it with a premise to the effect that courts should sometimes prevent 
legislatures from abrogating rights otherwise than by clear words. Fundamen-
tality has no obvious role to play: what is important is the enhancement of the 
parliamentary or electoral process in respect of rights. This is not to say that 
the principle could not be expressed in terms of ‘fundamental rights’. It could 
be (and indeed in Coco it was), but the additional qualification would demand 
extrinsic justification. Nothing about the internal logic of the principle would 
require it, as it does in the case of the positive refinement (Syllogism B). The 
apparent difficulties in articulating what ‘fundamental’ means speak against 
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any persuasive extrinsic justification. The better view is that the significance 
placed upon identifying rights as ‘fundamental’ was just one way to respond 
to the empirical implausibility of Potter v Minahan. It is a response that is 
challenged by the alternative response founded upon the normativity of the 
principle of legality. 
B  Vulnerable Rights 
The normativity of the principle of legality directs our search away from an 
elusive category of ‘fundamental’ rights and towards a different kind of right. I 
call them ‘vulnerable’ rights. To understand how the principle of legality 
identifies ‘vulnerable’ rights, it is necessary first to understand how the 
principle of legality is reconciled with democratic imperatives. 
1 Objection from Democracy 
The rule in Potter v Minahan was not obviously susceptible to objections from 
democracy. Of course, given what we know about O’Connor-the-framer’s 
sceptical attitude to the supposed rights-respecting credentials of legislatures, 
the rule might have been privately imagined by O’Connor-the-judge as a veil 
for judicial oversight. At the very least, the application of the rule in particular 
cases might have frustrated legislative expectations or the majority will (even 
inadvertently). And it is possible, as Chief Justice French has suggested, that 
the rule had ‘its origins in a rather anti-democratic, judicial antagonism to 
change wrought by statute’.118 As early as 1938, there appears to have been 
criticism of the presumption as it was applied in Canada and the purported 
consistency of its application with authentic legislative intention.119 The 
outward grammar of the principle nonetheless involved the courts in nothing 
more than giving statutory words the ‘meaning in which they were … really 
used’.120 While individual decisions might be open to allegations of error, the 
principle derived its systemic force from an acceptance of its positive claim 
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that the legislature was unlikely to have intended to abrogate common law 
rights by general words. As Goldsworthy says, citing Dicey, ‘[t]he traditional 
justification for [the principle] was entirely consistent with parliamentary 
sovereignty’.121  
The new normative basis for the principle of legality, conversely, directly 
invites objections from democracy, because it claims that the courts are 
sometimes justified in giving statutory language a meaning other than that 
intended by the legislature (and not only for semantic or textualist reasons). 
The objection takes the form of the familiar ‘counter-majoritarian difficul-
ty’:122 how is it legitimate that the will of a court should prevail over the 
majority will expressed through its representative legislature? So the objection 
goes, judges interpreting statutes ought only to ‘carry out decisions they do 
not make’, acting as the ‘honest agents of the political branches’.123 Any 
deviation from giving effect to the meaning Parliament intended is, on this 
view, objectionable. 
The counter-majoritarian difficulty was classically articulated as an objec-
tion not against interpretation, but against judicial review of legislation. Bickel 
recognised that many forces in a sophisticated democracy operate in a 
counter-majoritarian fashion. Judicial review was said to be more problematic 
than others because the ‘legislative majority … is, in turn, powerless to affect 
the judicial decision.’ 124  Mere interpretations, therefore, may seem less 
objectionable than invalidations. Could not the legislature, if it disagreed with 
the court’s interpretation, override that interpretation where it could not 
override a declaration of invalidity? After all, ‘if Parliament does not like the 
way a statute has been construed by the courts, it has it within its power to 
amend the statute.’125 Thus, French CJ has sought to emphasise that the 
principle of legality ‘does not constrain legislative power’126 and Justice 
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Gummow, similarly, said that ‘[i]t is one thing to deny legislative power and 
another to encourage clear statements of legislative intent’.127 
Despite its initial attraction, such reasoning does not, with respect, always 
fit comfortably within the Australian constitutional context. The idea that 
legislative amendment can always overcome judicial interpretation is inherit-
ed from British constitutional traditions and is not translatable to a system of 
strong bicameralism. In the United Kingdom, at least since the passage of the 
Parliament Act 1911128 the legislature can override judicial decisions subject 
only to the political priorities of the government-controlled129 House of 
Commons. The power of the House of Lords is one only of deferral.130 In 
Australia, the need to secure the assent of both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, whose respective powers are virtually equal and which may be 
controlled by different and equally disciplined political parties, means that a 
judicial interpretation can persist, even if one of the Houses would never have 
agreed to that interpretation and even if both Houses, acting on a clean slate, 
would together have agreed to some different interpretation. The counter-
majoritarian difficulty is, therefore, no less acute (and in some circumstances 
more acute) in the case of ‘mere’ interpretation. 
Interpretation ‘introduces the judge as a decision-maker who can create a 
new default position’.131 I will call a judicial interpretation that differs from 
the actual legislative intention or meaning an ‘incongruent’ interpretation, 
using that adjective without any pejorative connotation. In addition to the 
‘inertia’ by which ‘the legislature’s freedom of action and its readiness to make 
its response in colloquies with the judiciary are qualified’,132 there are substan-
tive obstacles to the possibility of bicameral override of an incongruent 
interpretation — ‘it is not just that the writers of laws may not have sufficient 
time or interest to correct interpretive mistakes, the structure of the legislative 
process will, in many instances, make it impossible for them to do so.’133 
 
 127 Justice Gummow, above n 50, 177. 
 128 1 & 2 Geo 5, c 13. 
 129 See Duxbury, above n 12, 41. On occasion a minority government, or a majority coalition, 
has commanded the confidence of the House of Commons: see Vernon Bogdanor, The Coali-
tion and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2011). 
 130 See Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2009) 146–9. 
 131 Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, above n 13, 167. 
 132 Bickel, above n 122, 206. But see William N Eskridge Jr, ‘Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions’ (1991) 101 Yale Law Journal 331, 336–43. 
 133 Jerry L Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 
(Yale University Press, 1997) 101–2 (emphasis in original). 
2013] The Normativity of the Principle of Legality 401 
Assume that each house of Parliament has an ideal policy position. An 
enactment approved by both houses will embody a compromise position 
somewhere between the two ideal positions. If a judicial interpretation shifts 
the meaning from the understood compromise position, but the incongruent 
position that it settles is no further from the ideal position of any one house 
than the compromise position in fact reached, then the one house will have 
no incentive to agree to override the incongruent interpretation. In other 
words, if just one house prefers the court’s new position to the thwarted 
compromise position (or even if it is indifferent as between the two), that 
house will veto any remedial amendments proposed by the other house.134 
The immediate aftermath of Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration 
and Citizenship (‘Malaysian Declaration Case’)135 illustrates the phenomenon. 
The Labor government’s ideal position was to have the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth) authorise its policy of transferring asylum seekers to Malaysia.136 I will 
stipulate for present purposes that this be taken to be the ideal position of the 
House of Representatives, which is ordinarily controlled by the government 
(thus putting to one side the unusual complications of a hung parliament).137 
The Senate’s ideal position is a little more complex to discern, since a minor 
party held the balance of power. The Liberal-National Coalition favoured its 
own ‘Pacific Solution’, and the Australian Greens favoured onshore processing. 
The Migration Act 1958 (Cth), prior to the Malaysian Declaration Case, was 
thought to be ‘well accepted and understood on both sides of the House’138 to 
enable both the Malaysian and Pacific Solutions, depending on the preference 
of the government of the day — effectively a compromise between Labor and 
the Coalition. In the Malaysian Declaration Case, the High Court ruled out 
the Malaysian Solution (the House of Representatives’ stipulated ideal 
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position) as a matter of statutory construction.139 It did not clearly rule out the 
Pacific Solution,140 and certainly did not rule out onshore processing. There-
fore, neither the Coalition nor the Greens had any strong incentive to agree to 
the government’s proposed amendments after the decision.141 Together, they 
would have ensured the Senate’s veto had the amending Bill progressed that 
far. That is so even though, if acting on a blank slate, the Coalition would have 
agreed to a compromise position to authorise the Pacific Solution.142  
‘Parliamentary supremacy’, as though Parliament were univocal, is no 
answer to incongruent interpretations in Australia, because the court is not a 
second and subordinate actor. It is a third actor in a potentially complex 
‘game’.143 In this way, the normativity of the principle of legality, by embracing 
incongruent interpretation and deviation from the ‘faithful agent’ theory of 
statutory interpretation, is susceptible to the same objections levelled against 
judicial review of legislation. 
2 Answering the Objection 
Overcoming the counter-majoritarian difficulty has been a central project of 
American constitutional theory. One very influential response came from 
Bickel’s own student, John Hart Ely.144 Ely defended a conception of judicial 
review which he said was not counter-majoritarian because it was ‘representa-
tion-reinforcing’.145  He meant that judicial review legitimately protected 
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systemic features of representative institutions and therefore majoritarian 
government. He meant that courts should ‘keep the machinery of democratic 
government running as it should, to make sure the channels of political 
participation and communication are kept open’146 and to ‘facilitat[e] the 
representation of minorities’.147 Although the political process may be the 
primary ‘mechanism of constitutional constraint’,148 it is at those points where 
it is ‘inherently weak or endangered’149 that judicial supervision has a legiti-
mate role to play. 
We might adapt Ely’s theory of judicial review to the context of statutory 
interpretation, and in doing so defend the apparently counter-majoritarian 
complexion of the principle of legality.150 The adaptation is at least prima facie 
defensible because of the normative affinity between Ely’s theory and the 
principle of legality as it was articulated in Simms (and Coco): both are about 
facilitating and improving the political process. According to this adaptation, 
courts may legitimately insist upon a clearer statement of legislative intention 
in service of protecting ‘vulnerable’ rights. Some rights may not be adequately 
protected by ordinary political processes, in the sense that there is a real risk 
they might be abrogated by Parliament without effective opportunity for 
electoral discipline. Where the rights-holders are a politically weak minority 
(perhaps because they are ‘discrete and insular’);151 where the rights them-
selves concern the substance of representative government and the political 
process; or where the circumstances are otherwise such that only an especially 
clear statement of legislative intent will ensure sufficient political scrutiny; 
then the rights at stake may be described as ‘vulnerable’ in the relevant sense 
— that is, vulnerable to casual abrogation. A clear statement principle has the 
purpose and effect of reinforcing the political process: ensuring that legislators 
take responsibility for any decision to abrogate vulnerable rights, and that 
their decision is subjected to electoral scrutiny. It may be that something like 
‘vulnerability’ inheres in Gageler and Keane JJ’s articulation of the principle of 
legality in terms of ‘rights, freedoms, immunities, principles and values that 
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are important within our system of representative and responsible govern-
ment under the rule of law’.152 
Political minorities are not, of course, always vulnerable. In a pluralist 
political system, it can be the diffuse majorities that are vulnerable to a market 
for legislation dominated by powerful interest groups. 153  The inherent 
weaknesses of the political process can manifest not only in legislation that 
abrogates rights, but also in legislation that, for example, creates or misallo-
cates economic rents, thereby serving private over public interests.154 How the 
principle of legality might evolve ‘symmetrically’ to accommodate this 
circumstance is beyond the scope of this article. I simply foreshadow that 
there may be contexts other than the abrogation of rights in which normative 
clear statement principles would be equally justified. 
The concept of vulnerable rights, as well as having justificatory force, also 
has explanatory force. Pearce and Geddes list more than 40 rights that have 
been held to engage the principle of legality.155 I do not propose to traverse 
them all. But consider some of the central types. Criminal process rights and 
cognate rights — which for present purposes I understand broadly to include 
aspects of investigation, prosecution and penalty in the regulatory environ-
ment — are classically ‘vulnerable’. The relevant rights-holders tend to be 
politically weak, while the public interest in the detection and punishment of 
wrongdoing is strong and apt to confer substantial political credit upon 
elected officials who align themselves with that interest. It has recently been 
observed that ‘tough law and order policies’ in the states have become ‘a key 
driver of the constitutional agenda’.156 In those circumstances, the risk is high 
that rights will come to be abrogated without especially anxious considera-
tion. Curial insistence upon a clear statement of legislative intention nudges 
the calculus not in favour of the right per se, but in favour of political scrutiny 
and electoral discipline of the decision to abrogate the right. It guards against 
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casual intrusion upon, or ‘inadvertent and collateral alteration’ of, 157  a 
vulnerable class of rights. Thus, a clear statement is necessary to abrogate the 
privilege against self-incrimination, 158  legal professional privilege, 159  and 
procedural fairness.160 A clear statement is necessary to authorise arrest and 
detention, 161  entry upon and search of property, 162  use of information 
obtained by telephone interception,163 and compulsory production of docu-
ments.164 The principle extends to the construction of substantive criminal 
provisions, requiring a clear statement to impose, for example, criminal 
liability for failure to observe a positive duty retroactively created,165 or for 
conduct based on an honest and reasonable mistake of fact.166 Refugee law  
is another prominent context in which rights of procedural fairness,167 
personal liberty,168 and access to the courts169 are vulnerable in the sense being 
discussed. 
Freedom of expression,170 freedom of assembly,171 open courts,172 and 
similar rights associated with participation,173 are vulnerable in a somewhat 
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different sense. French CJ described freedom of speech as ‘linked to the 
proper functioning of representative democracies’ and as ‘never more 
powerful than when it involves the discussion and criticism of public authori-
ties and institutions’.174 Rights of this kind underpin the capacity of the 
governed to effect change in their representative institutions. They are, 
therefore, more than ‘important’ in some abstract sense. They are also 
inherently vulnerable to attack from those who happen to control the repre-
sentative institutions at any given point in time and who would seek to 
entrench their control. Curial insistence upon a clear statement of intent, 
again, ensures that legislatures do not evade electoral scrutiny of controversial 
decisions to intrude upon these rights. 
The notion of ‘vulnerable’ rights also explains the central cases in which 
the courts have held the principle of legality not to be engaged. For example, 
in Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (‘Electrolux’), 
the Court construed provisions conferring immunity from liability for 
damage occasioned by protected industrial action.175 Although the immunity 
curtailed common law rights to sue, a majority of the Court did not apply the 
principle of legality.176 Gleeson CJ most clearly explained why: 
The assistance to be gained from a presumption will vary with the context in 
which it is applied … 
The rights of action taken away are common law rights of a kind frequently 
modified by statute in the industrial context with which the legislation is con-
cerned.177 
Industrial law and politics in Australia is generally characterised by very well-
organised representation on behalf of both employer and employee interests. 
There is little reason to suspect that the ordinary political process will not 
adequately manage the competing interests at stake. In other words, rights in 
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the industrial law context are not ordinarily ‘vulnerable’, so the principle of 
legality is not ordinarily engaged. 
Malika Holdings,178 which concerned a company’s right to challenge its 
customs duty liability, is similar. In matters concerning revenue law there is 
little reason to suspect that striking a balance between the interests of the 
revenue and the taxpayer through the ordinary political process will inade-
quately protect the taxpayer’s rights. This observation is consistent with the 
abandonment of the outdated approach to interpreting revenue statutes, 
which treated them as analogous to penal statutes that should be narrowly 
construed.179  
I should not be thought to suggest that the criterion of vulnerability readily 
denotes an obvious category of rights, or even one that is fixed or determinate. 
The criterion denotes a mode of analysis or reasoning — a framework for 
argument about whether a given right should or should not attract the 
protection of the principle of legality. Indeed, the same right in different 
contexts may or may not be vulnerable. Or, at least, it might be vulnerable to a 
different degree. The spectral quality of ‘vulnerability’, compared to the binary 
quality of ‘fundamentality’, makes the concept more sensitive to the different 
contexts in which it might be applied. The same right might or might not be 
sufficiently ‘vulnerable’, and therefore might or might not engage the principle 
of legality, depending upon the particular context. Context will also inform 
the closely related question of what degree of clarity is sufficient to displace 
the presumption against abrogation: ‘the degree of clarity required may vary 
from right to right and … from time to time.’180 
For example, I claimed above that a refugee’s right to procedural fairness is 
‘vulnerable’. But it really depends on the context. Consider Plaintiff S10/2011 v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘Plaintiff S10’).181 The Minister’s 
obligation to afford procedural fairness in considering whether to exercise 
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certain dispensing provisions was held to be abrogated by the legislation in 
question. The necessary clarity was identified in ‘[t]he cumulative signifi-
cance’182 of a range of structural features of the statutory scheme. Significantly, 
those features included: that the affected individual would necessarily have 
gone through an administrative process of original decision and merits 
review;183 and that by parliamentary tabling requirements, ‘the Minister is 
rendered accountable in an immediate sense to each House of the Parlia-
ment’.184 In other words, the scheme was seen already to provide certain 
mechanisms of political accountability, so that any further ‘curial insistence’ 
upon a clearer statement was unnecessary or unjustified. 
It might be objected that if vulnerability has this context-dependent quali-
ty, then ‘vulnerable rights’ are no more stable or no less idiosyncratic than 
‘fundamental rights’. It is important, however, not to mistake uncertainty for 
idiosyncrasy. Legal standards can be — indeed, almost always are — uncer-
tain, or vague, at least in their penumbral application. They can be uncertain 
without being so devoid of content as to depend upon, say, ‘idiosyncratic 
notions of fairness and justice’.185 ‘Vulnerability’, in the sense I have described, 
has, I think, somewhat more content than the present understanding of 
‘fundamentality’, which seems to be more a conclusory label than an explica-
tive standard from which ‘[r]ules and principles [can] emerge’.186 Of course, 
we might disagree about whether particular rights in particular contexts are 
‘vulnerable’ or not, but that is not necessarily to say that we disagree about  
the essential content of the standard by which those rights fall to be classified  
as such. 
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Perhaps a stronger objection is that to the extent the vulnerability of a right 
depends upon the context in which it is claimed, Parliament cannot reasona-
bly know in advance whether in a particular context the courts will regard a 
right as attracting the clear statement principle. There can be no absolute 
answer to this objection. Whether Parliament can be taken to be aware that a 
particular right attracts the clear statement principle is very important within 
the positive accounts of the principle of legality.187 That is so because the 
positive accounts purport to give effect to Parliament’s authentic intentions 
and genuine standing commitments. And that is why, in the previous section, 
I argued that ‘fundamental’ must mean ‘well-established’, within positive 
accounts of the principle of legality. But notice to Parliament is less important 
in the normative accounts. It is true that the normative version of the princi-
ple of legality turns on requiring Parliament ‘squarely [to] confront what it is 
doing’. And it may be accepted that if Parliament is unaware that a particular 
right in a particular context will be regarded by the courts as ‘vulnerable’, then 
it may not be moved ‘squarely [to] confront what it is doing’. Be that as it may, 
the normativity of the principle of legality would demand in any event that 
the courts give protection to the vulnerable right: it is the vulnerability, and 
not Parliament’s actual or imputed knowledge, which animates the court. It 
should be added that the cases in which the context compels a court to 
surprise the Parliament by recognising a new vulnerable right are likely to be 
rare. More frequently, I would expect contextual considerations to result, as in 
Plaintiff S10, in a well-known right being characterised as not relevantly 
vulnerable in the circumstances. 
The examples canvassed in this section could be multiplied. Debate might 
be had at the margins and in particular cases. But I hope to have sketched the 
case for understanding the principle of legality to be engaged only by rights 
that are ‘vulnerable’. 
C  Statutory Rights 
If it be correct that the principle of legality is engaged by ‘vulnerable’ rights, 
then there is no particular reason why those rights need to be ‘common law’ 
rights. In particular, vulnerable rights might well have their source in legisla-
tion. To accommodate the principle of legality to the realities of the modern 
regulatory state, statutory rights should also be understood to be capable of 
engaging the principle of legality. 
 
 187 See especially Sales, above n 2, 605. 
410 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 37:372 
Finn J articulated this very approach in Buck v Comcare.188 Mrs Buck had 
been in receipt of compensation payments under the Safety, Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). Comcare suspended her payments under a 
provision of that Act: 
Where an employee refuses or fails, without reasonable excuse, to undergo [a 
medical examination], or in any way obstructs an examination, the employee’s 
rights to compensation … are suspended until the examination takes place. 
Finn J construed the provision as depending upon a jurisdictional fact (that 
the employee was without reasonable excuse) determinable by a court, rather 
than upon a decision or opinion of Comcare. In arriving at that construction, 
Finn J had regard to the rights-abrogative character of the provision. His 
Honour acknowledged that Mrs Buck’s right to compensation did ‘not fall into 
the category of “common law” rights which traditionally have been safeguard-
ed from legislative interference’,189 but continued: 
To confine our interpretative safeguards to the protection of ‘fundamental 
common law rights’ is to ignore that we live in an age of statutes and that it is 
statute which, more often than not, provides the rights necessary to secure the 
basic amenities of life in modern society.190 
The recipients of various government benefits are often (not always) marginal-
ised groups lacking in political power. The entitlements to those benefits can 
therefore be seen to be ‘vulnerable’ statutory rights in the sense previously 
discussed. Indeed, forms of ‘government largess’ have long been recognised as 
sharing common features with traditional property rights, which the principle 
of legality has historically protected:191 
in the case of government largess, nothing turns on the fact that it originated in 
government. The real issue is how it functions and how it should function. … 
The grant, denial, revocation, and administration of all types of government 
largess should be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures.192 
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Various statutory non-discrimination regimes may also be seen to confer 
rights upon certain vulnerable groups. Chief Justice Spigelman contemplated 
whether these statutory norms of non-discrimination on grounds such as 
race, sex or disability could be recognised as fundamental common law 
rights.193 On my account of vulnerable statutory rights, those norms may be 
brought within the protection of the principle of legality without first needing 
to develop the common law in the way that Spigelman foreshadowed. 
Statutory rights that would be vulnerable in the ‘participatory’ sense might 
include access to merits or judicial review, or rights of appeal.194 They would 
include rights under electoral laws.195 The principle of legality could also 
extend to protect those ‘quasi-constitutional statutes’ which establish ‘integrity 
branch’ structures for the systemic protection of vulnerable rights.196 
It is well-established that ‘the law presumes that statutes do not contradict 
one another’.197 Gaudron J explained the strength of that presumption: 
in the absence of express words, an earlier statutory provision is not repealed, 
altered or derogated from by a later provision unless an intention to that effect 
is necessarily to be implied. There must be very strong grounds to support that 
implication, for there is a general presumption that the legislature intended that 
both provisions should operate …198 
This presumption applies generally. So it would apply particularly to a 
statutory provision said to abrogate a right conferred by another statutory 
provision. It may, therefore, be open to doubt whether there is any conceptual 
need to extend the principle of legality to protect statutory rights. The 
principle of harmonious construction already offers protection against 
implied repeal of statutory rights. Whether or not there is a need, the two 
interpretive approaches are consistent and mutually reinforcing. If the 
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principle of legality were to be synthesised with the presumption against 
inconsistency, then the rights-protective orientation of the principle of legality 
might emerge as an additional consideration, perhaps even a dominant 
consideration, when courts make the evaluative judgment as to whether or 
not two provisions (in the one statute or in different statutes) can stand 
together. This is worth emphasising: the principle of legality would operate 
not as a conflict-resolution rule, but as an anterior interpretive principle 
directed to dissolving apparent conflict.199 If one of the statutes in issue 
confers a vulnerable right, the court should be very slow to find contrariety 
between that right and general, vague or ambiguous language said to abrogate 
it. As with common law rights, the court could insist upon a clear statement  
of intent. 
Such an approach might have led to different outcomes in some of the 
decided cases. Consider, for example, Ferdinands v Commissioner for Public 
Employment (‘Ferdinands’).200 Majorities in the Supreme Court of South 
Australia201 and the High Court held that the Industrial and Employee 
Relations Act 1994 (SA) and the Police Act 1998 (SA) could not both apply to 
the termination of Mr Ferdinands’ employment as a police officer. The Police 
Act 1998 (SA) ‘appear[ed] intended to deal comprehensively with questions of 
termination’.202 Only Kirby J, in dissent, had overt regard to the effect upon 
Mr Ferdinands’ statutory rights: 
important and beneficial privileges, expressed in unqualified language … being 
protective of valuable legal rights … would not ordinarily be read down … At 
least, this would not be done without clear provisions indicating that such was 
the purpose of the legislature.203 
If the principle of legality had been engaged in this or similar cases, it is not 
inconceivable that different results might have followed.204 
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IV  CO N C LU SI O N  
Despite an outward appearance of continuity, the contemporary principle of 
legality is not the same as the rule in Potter v Minahan. They differ not simply 
in content and scope, but in their basic constitutional justification. The rule 
originally rested upon a claim, positive in character, that Parliament would 
not intend to abrogate common law rights. That central claim is descriptively 
false in the conditions of the modern activist state. To preserve the principle 
of legality, the courts have transformed its justification. There have been two 
distinct and parallel strategies to accommodate the change. The first is a 
positive refinement: though it cannot be said that an activist legislature would 
not intend to abrogate common law rights generally, it can be said that it 
would not intend to abrogate ‘fundamental’ common law rights. The second is 
a normative refinement: irrespective of parliament’s authentic legislative 
intention (and irrespective of whether there can be such a thing), courts 
should attribute a legislative intention not to abrogate rights, because to do so 
would enable or enhance mechanisms of political accountability and electoral 
discipline that are seen to be proper incidents of our system of representative 
and responsible government. 
Understanding this transformation of the principle of legality is significant 
in its own right. But it also gives us the resources to answer one of the most 
important, but difficult, questions in the field: what rights engage the principle 
of legality? The difference of opinion between Spigelman and French CJ about 
the utility of ‘fundamentality’ can be explained as reflecting the difference 
between the two rival conceptions of the contemporary principle of legality. 
The purpose that ‘fundamentality’ serves — that is, to refine the positive claim 
about authentic legislative intention — gives content to the concept: rights are 
‘fundamental’ only if it is empirically true that the legislature would not intend 
to abrogate them using general words. On the other hand, the new normativi-
ty of the principle of legality directs our attention away from ‘fundamental’ 
rights and towards ‘vulnerable’ rights. ‘Vulnerable’ rights are those rights 
which the political process is inherently inapt to protect, because they are 
claimed by a politically weak minority, or because they go to the substance of 
the political process and democratic representation itself. ‘Vulnerability’ is not 
a criterion that identifies a determinate set of rights, but rather a mode of 
analysis or framework for argument to apply to the particular circumstances 
in the particular context. Furthermore, nothing about the idea of a ‘vulnera-
ble’ right implies that it need be a ‘common law’ right. Many vulnerable rights 
have a statutory source. They too should attract the protection of the principle 
of legality. 
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The justifications for legal rules matter. They matter because they inform 
the proper content and scope of the rules. Although the principle of legality is 
now firmly established in the law, its proper justification and rationale remain 
contested. That contestation, until it is settled, will undermine the coherence 
of the principle’s content and scope. It has been my objective in this article, by 
explaining the distinctiveness of the positive and normative justifications and 
their respective doctrinal implications, to lay the analytical groundwork for  
a settlement. 
